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Abstract 
Our purposes in part I of the essay are: 1) to suggest that womb envy has been a 
significant element in the formation of our culture (in the context of the traditions of 
Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and Islam), and 2) to make more evident the presence 
and the significance of the devaluation of nurturing in our society, in part by linking this 
devaluation of nurturing to its history in the phenomenon of womb envy.  In part II, we 
look at how the devaluation of nurturing is manifested in the practice of psychodynamic 
therapy. The devaluation of nurturance is thus viewed in a context where the writers 
have intimate knowledge and experience. We find that a downplaying of the 
significance of nurturing in our society results in a general lack of empathy and sensitivity, 
and a deemphasis on relational competence, as well as an overall devaluing of 
women. An emphasis on profit and production moves relational concerns into the 
background. In the context of psychotherapy, we suggest, our society‟s emphasis on 
hierarchy and authority interferes with nurturing as a therapeutic factor. We also discuss 
various attempts that writers have made to support the role of nurturing in 
psychotherapy.  
 
Keywords: womb envy, Western society, devaluing nurturing, social contexts and 
nurturing. 
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Introduction 
 
We would like to begin with a poem by Emily Dickinson  
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant— 
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
The Truth's superb surprise 
As Lightning to the Children eased 
With explanation kind 
The Truth must dazzle gradually 
Or every man be blind— 
 
In order to tell the truth, Emily Dickinson had 'to tell it slant.' She was, after all, a free-
spirited woman living in a Puritanical 19th century New England community.  
 
Telling it slant is also familiar to depth psychology. This psychology, too, has to dazzle 
gradually. Deep psychological truth does not come directly, but emerges in bits and 
pieces, through gradual processing, emotional and intellectual. After over a 
hundred years, for example, psychoanalysis is still struggling to tell the truth about the 
existence of the unconscious (Brenner, 1974). In many ways, it continues to struggle 
trying to receive a welcome ear.  
 
Writing about our culture‟s devaluation of nurturing, we also face a communication 
dilemma. For the tendency to devalue nurturing is so familiar to us in our world that 
some people may not notice it at all, let alone appreciate its significance. We 
attempt to address this problem by linking this attitude towards nurturing with 
aspects of its history in the phenomenon of womb envy, where the social dynamics 
of the devaluation of nurturing were both far more overt and more clearly 
destructive than they are today. As mentioned below, this use of history is also 
intended to link the devaluation of nurturing to a far off context in order to remove it 
from what is familiar so that it can be seen in a new light.  
 
First, we provide background on the topic of womb envy. Then we examine it in the 
context of Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Islamic tradition. After that, we discuss 
womb envy as an example of a general devaluation of nurturing in contemporary 
society. In the latter part of the essay we attempt to bring the subject closer to home 
(for us therapists and others) by examining the issue of the devaluing of nurturing in 
the specific context of psychotherapy today, psychotherapy being—it would 
seem—a kind of nurturing. For our training as therapists, our identities as therapists, 
our roles as therapists, and our clients‟ lives all are a part of this same culture we are 
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examining. Part II is based in part on the provocative question, what does it mean to 
be a therapist in a culture that tends to devalue nurturing? We suggest that 
psychotherapy forms an alliance with the devaluation of nurturing even as it runs 
counter to it.  (We will focus in particular on psychodynamic therapy, since it has an 
important and evocative relationship with the issue of psychological nurturing.)  
 
When we say that our culture “tends to” devalue nurturing, we wish to suggest that 
we are describing variable tendencies, and not absolutes. There is a significant part 
of the society that does appreciate nurturing. In fact, one might say there is an 
ambivalence in our culture about the value of nurturing. On the one hand, mothers, 
young children, and the family are deeply valued, not only by their loved ones, but 
by the culture. On the other hand, however, this appreciation is in part a rhetorical 
one which exists side by side with the lack of power, prestige, and income linked with 
activities of nurturing in a society that tends to emphasize not nurturing but the 
production and consumption of material goods. (The nurturing part of the culture 
helps to ease the stress and pain created by the realities of capitalism.) 
 
 It is difficult to see womb envy clearly because we are part of the culture that 
devalues nurturing (Miller, 2003).  We cannot wholly stand outside this tendency to 
devalue nurturing. The concepts, tools, and experiences that we use to understand 
the devaluing of nurturing have been shaped by the culture that tends to devalue 
nurturing. Therefore, we must 'tell it slant' both because our culture has difficulty 
hearing us, and because we ourselves have difficulty seeing clearly a phenomenon 
of which we are a part. Finally, as psychoanalysis has shown, it is rather useless trying 
to convey a deep psychic reality by means of making intellectual statements. With 
regard to womb envy, perhaps the best one can do is to try to elicit an interest in 
examining the phenomenon. 
 
To approach the devaluing of nurturing, therefore, we will use a device that 
addresses the topic indirectly. This device is history. By presenting familiar events in a 
far off context, history helps us to see these events in a new way (as in the „alienation 
technique‟ of Brechtian theater). We will look at womb envy in the context of some 
of its ideological origins; specifically, in the context of the three inter-related religions 
which form part of the base of our culture, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and Islam. 
Finally, we would like to note that we are examining certain historical trends; many 
people have experiences and interpretations of these religions which are very 
different from what might be suggested by the historical descriptions presented 
here. 
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Part I  
Introduction to Womb Envy 
 
Various prominent writers have highlighted the importance of studying womb envy, 
or the male envy of the female reproductive capacity. These include Bruno 
Bettelheim, Eric Fromm, Ralph Greenson, Karen Horney, Edith Jacobson, Melanie 
Klein, Margaret Meade and John Ross (Bettelheim, 1954, 1962; Fromm, 1943; 
Greenson, 1968; Horney, 1926; Jacobson, 1950; Klein, 1975; Meade, 1949; Ross, 1975, 
1977). Horney (1926) stirred up interest in the discussion of womb envy in the 1920's. 
This was part of her incisive critique of male bias in psychoanalysis. Edith Jacobson 
(1950) called a good deal of attention to the phenomenon in a once well-known 
1950's essay. Melanie Klein (1975) also addressed this issue. She suggested that the 
male infant's envy of the soothing breast later translates into an envy of his mother's 
childbearing capacity.  
 
Yet the phenomenon of womb envy appears to remain mostly unconscious. It is not 
a topic easily digested by our culture. The idea that men envy the ability to bear 
children is hard to grasp in a culture that on the whole devalues nurturing, in a 
culture which, despite efforts to the contrary, tends to defend against the 
appreciation of nurturing (Chodorow, 1978; Jaffe, 1968).  
 
Evidence for the existence of womb envy comes from many contexts. Ross (1975, 
1977, p. 334) supports the idea based on his observation of young males as they 
discover that they will not be able to have babies like their mothers. Young male 
children hold their mothers in awe. Their mothers are the powerful and soothing 
centers of the universe. Their mothers give them strength and joy. Wanting to be like 
mother, male children at a young age will often nurse toy babies. They talk about 
wanting to have babies. When they come to realize that they cannot have a baby, 
Ross believes, they face the problematic reality that they are, “Destined to be short-
changed” (1977, p. 334). 
 
Observations of womb envy have emerged from many sources. Analysts have 
become convinced of the fundamental importance of womb envy after seeing it 
emerge over and again in their analysis of adult males (Bettelheim, 1954). 
Anthropological studies show many cultural practices designed to compensate men 
in fantasy because they cannot bear children in reality. The Island of Menstruating 
Men, for example, explores a tribal ritual in which males cut their penises every 
month as a symbol of fertility (Hogbin, 1970). Bettelheim's (1954, pp. 33-37) studies of 
children institutionalized for psychological reasons provide stark examples of womb 
  
Europe’s Journal of Psychology 
 
 
168 
envy. Further, Kittay (1995) states that in her discussions of the phenomenon in classes 
she teaches invariably males will say that they have experienced womb envy.  
 
The prodigious attention that writers have given to the concept of womb envy is 
ignored by the mainstream psychological literature (Daly, 1978).  It is as if the writings 
had never been written. This neglect is not a conscious one. Rather, it is a deeply 
rooted cultural resistance, an unconscious resistance. Taking seriously the concept of 
womb envy upsets basic assumptions of our culture. It questions the hierarchy, 
challenging the devaluing of childbirth and nurturing. It calls attention to how our 
society devalues unique strengths of the female gender, the gender this culture 
quietly seeks to represent as inferior. Clearly, we have a blind spot.   
 
There is a widespread defense against the idea that womb envy exists. Kittay (1983, 
1984) applied to womb envy Melanie Klein's interpretation of the defenses against 
envy. Our discussion will highlight four defenses against womb envy discussed by 
Kittay (1995, pp. 143-148): 1) The appropriation defense occurs when a man 
internalizes the desired object (procreative abilities) such that it becomes his 
possession. This is evidenced in rituals such as the re-birth of Baptism in which birth is 
appropriated into a male- dominated viewpoint (Cuttay, 1962).  2) The devaluation 
of the object defense involves the devaluation of childbirth or particular aspects of 
the female physiology. This is suggested by a religious view that menstruating women 
are unclean (Ranke-Heinemann, 1990).  3) An attempt to draw envy towards men 
while stirring it up in women is a defense evidenced in the exclusion of women from 
the important rite of circumcision in Judaism (Baile, 1984). 4) Finally, the stifling of 
feelings of love concurrent with an intensifying of hate defense is manifested by 
men's declared hatred of or indifference toward infants, nursing mothers, or 
pregnant women (El Saadawi, 1982). 
 
The Historical Emergence of Womb Envy 
 
We believe that the religious traditions of Islam, Roman Catholicism, and Judaism 
contain a sad and tragic subtext that tends to go unnoticed. Research suggests that 
these traditions harbor a deep male envy of a woman's ability to bear children. The 
religions appear to express this envy in their basic beliefs and practices (Daly 1973). 
This envy, it seems, is part of a tendency to devalue nurturing that characterizes our 
culture.  
 
Eisler (1987), Stone (1976) and others believed that prehistory was dominated by 
Goddess worshipping societies in which the childbearing ability of women was held 
in great esteem. According to these authors, it was believed that all things flowed 
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from the female deity's divine womb.  The authors thought that a deep awe of 
childbearing was fundamental to Goddess worship in these societies.   
 
Contemporary archeologists have challenged the myth of a generally matriarchal, 
Goddess worshipping prehistoric world.  The evidence available to us regarding 
gender relations and prehistory is somewhat sketchy and ambiguous (Eller, 2000).  
Hodder (2004) and his team suggest that female figurines and other evidence of the 
reverence of feminine deities suggest the symbolic importance of women in the 
Neolithic society, but not purely matriarchy.  This reverence of goddesses may  likely 
have stemmed from women‟s capacity to give birth (Daly, 1973).    
 
Leacock (1975) purports that female inferiority is not a universal condition.  Earlier 
hunter-gatherer or foraging societies described a generally equal relationship 
between men and women.  In such societies women procure about 80% of the 
sustenance.  The person who procures something for the society also distributes it 
and therefore it was largely women in these societies who determined band society 
movements including camp locations. 
 
The religions discussed in this paper, however, are clearly patriarchal. They advocate 
for a male God who created human beings. This God created the world to serve 
males, who are created in his image.  In Genesis, the first book of the Bible, woman is 
born from the body of man.  One interpretation of this story is that the fall from Eden 
represents the demise of hunter-gatherer life (Zeran, 2004).  Daly (1973, 1978) 
suggests that Eve coming from Adam‟s  rib, in a strange reversal, portrays  women's 
role in childbirth as unimportant.  As will be seen further on, men seem to appropriate 
the important role in procreation for themselves. The male role is exalted, while the 
female one is denigrated or denied. In exaggerated fashion, the religious traditions 
under study symbolically reverse the reality of procreation. This reversal, moreover, is 
often accompanied by defensiveness and contempt with regard to women's role in 
childbirth. For example, the defiling of menstruating women (discussed later) not only 
reverses what may have been a divine status of female fertility, but often has an 
intensely derogatory connotation which suggests defensiveness and contempt. 
There is a strong sense of male grandiosity, grandiosity being often characteristic of 
defenses. The religious traditions studied thus appear to echo the womb envy overtly 
portrayed in the rituals of so-called primitive cultures (Bettelheim, 1954; Hogbin, 1970; 
Mead, 1949).  
 
It has long been proposed that the religions under study have tended to facilitate 
the domination and control of women (Daly, 1978).  While explicitly focused, 
perhaps, on this domination and control, implicitly these traditions appear also to act 
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as defenses against the male envy of women's ability to bear children. Men seem to 
have envied the fact that the "inferior" sex, placed on earth to serve them, has the 
exclusive ability to bring forth life (Stevens, 2005). The religions in question 
encouraged men to have a grandiose self-image. This grandiose self-image appears 
to have been threatened by women's ability to procreate. The grandiose image 
both generates anxiety for men and is used in the attempt to fend off anxiety. 
 
Western religions cultivated male control over women's reproductive abilities in order 
to maintain the male line of descent (Eisler, 1987; Stevens, 2005). The intense focus on 
maintaining the male bloodline may suggest an appropriation defense against 
womb envy.  
 
We will now briefly describe apparent defenses against womb envy as represented 
in the three individual religions studied. In Judaism, the Torah lays down as law the 
male line of descent (Baile, 1984). The torah's law establishes extensive male control 
over female sexuality (Plaskow, 1990). Women are placed under the control of their 
fathers until they are married, and then under the control of their husbands.  
 
Through the symbolism of circumcision, Jewish tradition associates the health of the 
penis with the basic covenant with God (Plaskow, 1990).  The covenant is a pact of 
males who have been circumcised (a procedure that protects the penis from 
infection). The fact that this basic ritual of faith of necessity excludes women has 
been interpreted by some as an (unconscious) attempt on the part of men to stir up 
envy in others while drawing envy toward themselves (Plaskow, 1990). 
 
Ancient Jewish traditions held that childbirth resulted from a man planting his seed in 
a woman. The Rabbinical and Biblical literature frequently refer to this belief.  While 
Rabbinical and Biblical literature give the prominent role in childbirth to men, 
however, this literature, strangely, is preoccupied with discussing the exclusively 
female processes of reproduction, menstruation, and childbirth (Wegner, 1991). 
 
The penis is linked in a pact with God because the male seed creates the child; the 
womb is described in the scriptures as merely the property of the male God, who 
appropriates the woman‟s role in childbirth. In the scriptures, God controls female 
fertility by working "in the womb to form human life" (Carmody, 1987, p. 188). The 
imagery that describes this process is striking. In the story of Abraham's betrayal of 
Sarah (Gen. 20:1-18), God first closes and later opens the wombs of the house of 
Abimelech. In Sam. 1:1-20, God, who had mysteriously closed Hannah's womb, 
reopens it and gives her a child. Trible (1978) summarized Biblical passages with 
respect to the womb: "God conceives in the womb, God brings forth from the 
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womb, God receives out of the womb; and God carries from the womb to gray 
hairs” (p. 38).  
 
Ancient Judaism appears to have devalued childbearing as well as the related 
process of menstruation (Baile, 1984). Since Biblical times, new mothers, as well as 
menstruants, have been viewed as a source of defilement (Lev. 2:19). Even today, in 
Orthodox circles, Jewish law defines new mothers and menstruating women as 
niddah—those who are ostracized (Baile, 1984).  Moreover, the impurity of the new 
mother lasts longer if the baby is a girl. The ostracizing of new mothers and 
menstruating women suggests the devaluation of the object defense. It paves the 
way for the appropriation of childbearing by men.  
 
In ancient Roman Catholic symbolism, the male-centered ritual of re-birth through 
baptism powerfully displaces the birth by the mother.  While birth involves coming 
into the tainted natural world, the superior re-birth of baptism means coming into the 
family of God the Father.  A male-oriented ritual performed only by bishops, priests, 
and deacons, baptism holds the key to eternal life. The imagery of baptism, 
according to Ruether (1983), "…combines male womb envy with womb negation" 
(p. 144).  The re-birth of baptism by male priests overcomes the carnal gestation and 
birth of human mothers who, according to doctrine, have passed on sin and death 
to their offspring. Catholic symbolism portrays the newly baptized child as emerging 
from the spiritual womb purified. The child is then said to be, "Fed on milk from the 
breasts of Christ" (Ruether, 1988, p. 246). 
 
Roman Catholicism, like Judaism, appears to place great emphasis on male control 
over the childbearing process. This is stressed through the vehemence attached to 
the restrictions on abortion and birth control (Farrell, 1991). Intense hostility has at 
times been directed at women who would attempt to control their own procreative 
powers. Catholic women have been taught that the worst of sins is to deflect the 
male seed from its intended course in her womb (Ruether, 1983). This has often been 
treated as more sinful than rape, since rape does not interfere with the high purposes 
of the seed. There has often been a severe insistence against a Catholic woman 
being a decision-maker concerning the destiny of her body. To procreate and 
submit to the will of God has been seen as the Catholic woman's basic religious duty.  
The Roman Catholic attitude towards procreation suggests the appropriation 
defense against womb envy, as well as the stifling of feelings of love combined with 
the intensifying of hate.  
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Ancient Islamic tradition, like that of Judaism and Roman Catholicism, seems to 
depend on the male domination and control over women and defenses against 
womb envy, such as the appropriation defense. Again, the baby is created by the  
male God in the woman's womb. The child is said to be conceived based on male 
sperm alone. Women are seen as receptacles for the males' creative act (El 
Saadawi, 1980; Engineer, 1992). They are containers for the male sperm.                 
 
Islamic tradition, too, represents new mothers and menstruates as unclean. They are 
restricted from performing cultic duties, praying, and reading the Koran (Hjarpe, 
1983, p. 16). According to the Koran (n.d.), new mothers and menstruates are, "A 
pollution. Separate yourselves therefore from women and approach them not, until 
they be cleansed" (Sura: 223). 
 
In Islamic tradition, a girl's first menstruation signals a key step in the beginnings of 
male control over her body, which can act as an appropriation defense.  The 
adolescent girl's freedom of movement is usually completely curtailed when she 
begins to menstruate (El Saadawi, 1980). Most conservative Muslim families consider 
the menstruating girl a threat to family honor. She must preserve her virginity at all 
costs. Her family's honor, it has been said, hinges on her sexual purity. Young women 
who do not preserve their virginity, according to El Saadawi (1980), are likely to be 
punished with physical or moral death.  
 
The Contemporary Devaluation of Nurturing 
 
As psychoanalysis teaches us, human beings have an awesome power to forget. We 
have forgotten that an historical tendency to devalue nurturing became part of the 
foundation for today's social hierarchies. Our solid defenses numb us to this 
forgetfulness.  
 
Womb envy, part of an historical devaluing of nurturing, appears to have helped 
establish a male-dominated, authoritarian society which tends to devalue nurturing 
(Eisler, 1987). In recent decades, a good deal of feminist psychoanalytic scholarship  
(e.g., Dinnerstein (1976), Benjamin (1988), and Chodorow (1978), to name a few 
writers drawn on here) has critiqued this devaluation of nurturing. It has been noted 
that in the development of our society the values associated with masculinity, such 
as achievement in the workplace and self-reliance, have been honored, while those 
associated with femininity, such as nurturing and emotional connection, have been 
relatively devalued. We live in a society where, as Chodorow (1989) states, “Social 
and psychological oppression… is perpetuated in the structure of personality” (p. 
65). Unlike women, men “do not define themselves in relationship and have come to 
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suppress relational capacities and repress relational needs. This prepares them to 
participate in the affect-denying world of alienated work…” (Chodorow, 1978, p. 
207).” The patriarchal gender values constructed long ago by men, partially in 
revulsion against women, are now represented as if they are simply natural 
characteristics of men and women. 
 
Patriarchal culture depends not only on narrowing women‟s options for how they 
can work, get paid, support themselves, and behave. It also depends on policing 
the world of truth and correctness. It depends on absolute right and wrong, good 
and bad. It is obsessed with ranking and hierarchy. Behaviors, even human beings, 
are ranked as admirable or despicable. Just as little boys push away emotional 
connectedness in adopting their cultural identities, authoritarian culture pushes 
tender emotions to the side. Especially in males, but in females too, a certain 
numbness develops. A cold and lonely isolation, it often seems, comes to be 
experienced as normal. In such a culture, people at times can be deeply 
compassionate, but apart from certain limited situations (e.g., upon hearing of 
natural disasters) they may just forget this part of themselves. They (especially men) 
often tend to forget the existence of their deep and tender feelings, fearing that 
they might be seen as weak and vulnerable. Strict social and political limitations 
have been placed on how empathy is supposed to be employed.  Layton (2009) 
writes, “In the current era, empathy seems to have been dominantly re-defined as 
something we accord only to people who are most like us…”(p.10). The devaluation 
of nurturing is related to our society‟s valorizing of profit, production, and 
competitiveness, and not stressing, for example, the traditionally feminine concern 
with relationships and the relational. 
 
We are part of this culture that devalues nurturing. Its hierarchies have been carved 
into the depths of our being. As Benjamin (1988, pp. 7-8) suggests, even when we are 
committed to equality the structure of our underlying social and psychological world 
may continue to perpetuate domination. To discover evidence for the devaluing of 
nurturing, therefore, we might inquire into ourselves. We therapists may find it by 
inquiring into our therapeutic practice, where patriarchy and authoritarianism, we 
will suggest, continue implicitly to interfere with the act of nurturance. 
 
Part II 
Psychotherapy and Nurturing 
 
Even today, it appears, psychotherapy, which can be considered a practice of 
nurturing, frequently has its effectiveness dampened through an unconscious 
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reliance on patriarchal, authoritarian discourse, a discourse that devalues nurturing. 
Psychotherapy both supports and opposes hierarchical authority.  
 
Psychoanalysis until recent decades represented itself as a “science,” where science 
was experienced as a male- dominated discourse alleged to reveal “the absolute 
truth.” It has been said that Freud‟s (1959) development of psychoanalysis reflected 
the authoritarian culture of his time (Brenner, 1974; Stevens, 2005). Not only was 
psychoanalysis a “scientific” discourse, but it was based on a male model of human 
development. Psychoanalysis was a rational, authoritative, intellectual discourse in 
which nurturing was not understood to play a role. Moreover, the framework of 
analysis, where the patient merely free associates, while the analyst interprets the 
truth, is a fundamentally hierarchical framework. The analyst relies on theory; the 
patient merely on her emotions.  
 
Miller and Stiver (1997) support the idea that the relationship between therapist and 
client remains a hierarchical one: “We are proposing that cultures built on dominant-
subordinate relationships…have created a non-mutual model that permeates all 
relationships. We all have developed within this framework and it tends to determine 
the nature of even our most intimate relationships (p.50).”  What is more, a 
hierarchical relationship can continue because it is in the (typically unconscious) 
interest of those with power to avoid calling attention to its existence. Once power is 
made explicit, only then can it be seen as objectionable (Miller, 2003).  
 
In his book Therapeutic Communication, Wachtel (1993, pp. 70-73) has suggested 
that analysts often unintentionally present interpretations to patients in ways that 
come across as subtly dominating, condescending, or accusatory. These forms of 
communication, which would likely be rejected by analysts when made conscious, 
are often unconsciously passed on from training analysts to analytic candidates, and 
then finally to patients (or “clients”). Wachtel demonstrates how subtleties in the 
wording of therapist interpretations frequently result in their being received by clients 
as demeaning.  
 
Empathy, it often seems, may characterize the general presentation of a therapist‟s 
speech, providing a nurturing presence, while subtle intonations, connotations, or 
word choices in the background suggest underlying attitudes of dismissal, superiority, 
or skepticism which interfere with the therapist‟s ability to in fact empathize. Indeed, 
authoritarian dynamics in therapy may often be observable exclusively in the 
counter-transference, or in manifestations of the client‟s unconscious. Power 
dynamics, tending to resist visibility, often can be discovered only through the 
investigation of nuance, if they can be discovered at all (by the participating 
  
Womb envy and Western society 
 
 
175 
parties). It may be that a client can vaguely discern a dismissal only through his 
feeling sense of a sudden lack of resonance on the therapist‟s part whenever the 
client makes certain kinds of statements. Such a dynamic can be highly coercive 
since it can produce its effects without being noticed. Therapists at times silently rely 
on theory to legitimize their combating or dismissing a client‟s behavior that upsets 
them. Many works in non-psychological fields have shown that subtle power 
dynamics, naturalized and hidden within language, can infiltrate our consciousness 
on a constant basis without being noticed (Barthes, 1972, 1974; Foucault, 1990).  
 
Therapists can note the frequency of authoritative dynamics in psychotherapy 
through close listening to the subtle signs of power in one‟s own language, as well as 
in one‟s colleagues‟ statements about cases. In speaking amongst each other, we 
therapists at times make statements about clients with surprisingly insensitive or 
demeaning implications, perhaps based on the rationale that we are “getting off 
our chest” reactions to client behaviors we find highly annoying. Unless these 
reactions are analyzed, however, “getting them off our chest” only perpetuates 
them, as well as what may be their deep intellectual and emotional concomitants. It 
seems likely that even after decades of theoretical awareness about the dynamics 
of hierarchy in therapy, subtle hierarchical dynamics continue to take place there. 
Winnicott (1971, pp. 38-52), for example, called attention to them forty years ago. 
 
There are, of course, other reasons why therapists at times continue to rely on 
hierarchical, authoritative discourse in therapy. To begin with, the therapist‟s 
authority may be necessary to engender respect for the therapist‟s knowledge, 
expertise, and character. This authority helps the client to suspend his critical 
faculties (for periods of time) in order to be receptive towards the therapy. The 
therapist‟s status as expert, combined with the client‟s position of vulnerability (being 
the one whose intimate problems are addressed, who lacks the expertise, etc…,) 
creates a sense of hierarchy which seems unavoidable. For some therapists authority 
is a way of guarding against nurturing and the feelings associated with it because 
they can be seen as a threat to the legitimacy of authority. Then too both the 
positive transference and the transference of early parental figures onto the 
therapist make hierarchical dynamics seem impossible to avoid. Finally, most clients 
seem to want or even need the therapist to function in an authoritative way, though 
they likely have little awareness of what an alternative might be, or how one might 
go about implementing it. 
 
The dynamics of patriarchy and authority in therapy can create obstacles in the way 
of empathy, in the way of nurturing, and thus in the way of effective therapy. A 
therapist‟s leaning in the direction of the authoritative runs the risk of obstructing the 
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empathic connection necessary for healing to occur. An authoritative framework 
can make a client continually feel--consciously or unconsciously—like he is at any 
moment about to be judged. This can increase the client‟s anxiety and reliance on 
defenses, making the process of therapy less likely to be effective. An authoritative, 
hierarchical framework for therapy can also, whether explicitly or implicitly, coerce 
the client into merely accepting the therapist‟s views. This may reduce the therapist‟s 
ability to empathize with the client‟s experience, as well as discourage the client 
from arriving at conclusions in the way that she needs them.  An authoritative 
orientation can reduce the therapist‟s receptivity because authority depends on the 
adherence to certain established ideas. A hierarchical therapy tends to involve a 
therapist who, again explicitly or implicitly, takes charge and “knows the answers.” 
This can discourage creativity and initiative on the part of the client, stifling an 
emerging, unfolding process of growth before it has a chance to even take root. 
Just as the role of the priest (enacting womb envy) may have usurped the 
procreative power of women, the role of the authoritative therapist, who believes 
that he has the answers, can usurp the (pro)creative power of the client.  Winnicott 
(1971), believing creativity central to the process of therapy, was concerned about 
a therapist‟s knowing interpretations—that they would steal the client‟s creativity, 
which he needs for psychological growth (p. 57).        
 
Psychotherapy, however, not only relies on authoritative, patriarchal discourse, but 
has provided us with ways to counter this discourse. In creating psychoanalysis, Freud 
brought about a profession based less on the application of authoritative methods 
than on the analyst‟s empathic immersion in the psychological world of the patient. 
The creation of psychoanalysis was rooted not only in Freud‟s desire to find a cure for 
hysteria, but in his unusual capacity for empathy. Paradoxically, while Freud‟s wish to 
give psychoanalysis the supposed certainty of science lent an authoritarian aura to 
the practice, its scientific basis contributed to the procedure of making lengthy, non-
judgmental explorations of the patient‟s own self-directed thought processes, a 
deep practice of empathy based on respect for the thoughts of the patient. One 
can see both this deep empathy (traditionally a feminine discourse) and this stern 
„objective‟ authority (traditionally a masculine discourse) in Freud‟s (1912) striking 
comment that “[the analyst] must turn his own unconscious like a receptive organ 
towards the transmitting unconscious of the patient (p.115).” It was also scientific 
objectivity which led Freud to insist on avoiding influencing patients. This encouraged 
practitioners to treat psychoanalysis as a non-intrusive method which did not make 
suggestions, but only presented “the truth.” Thus the patient, not the analyst—that is, 
the authority-- to a large degree determined the direction and the content of the 
sessions. Despite the fact that Freud played the role of authority, there was a strong 
mutual and collaborative aspect to psychoanalysis from the start.   
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Although his influence was somewhat limited due to his personal and professional 
split with Freud, Sandor Ferenczi early in the history of psychoanalysis developed 
views which departed from authoritarian, patriarchal aspects of the practice. 
Ferenczi placed much emphasis in analysis on relationships--both the role of 
relationships in the development of emotional problems (for example, in the 
causation of trauma) and the role of the relationship between the analyst and the 
patient (Aron & Harris, 1993; Ferenczi, 1932). Ferenczi believed that analysts need a 
more nurturing relationship with patients--less detached and authoritarian, more 
caring and collaborative. Although Freud believed that the relationship between the 
analyst and the patient during the positive transference plays a key role in the 
success of the treatment, Freud saw psychoanalysis as a practice based on the 
pursuit of truth, not the development of a relationship. Since Freud, psychoanalysis 
has increasingly focused on relationships and the relational, which has resulted in 1) 
a tendency to see analysis as involving perspectives developed by the analyst and 
the patient, and not simply the analyst‟s views, and 2) new viewpoints on the causes 
of, the nature of, and the means of treating patients‟ emotional disturbances. This 
has involved a greater appreciation of the role of nurturing in psychological growth, 
both the mother‟s nurturing of her child, and the therapist‟s nurturing of her client. 
 
Ferenczi was the analyst of Balint, and Balint took further some of Ferenczi‟s 
concerns. For example, patients said to be seeking in the analytic relationship “to 
gratify primitive sexual and aggressive wishes” (wishes more linked with  inner “drives” 
than with object relationships) Balint (1952) described as seeking love that they had 
been deprived of early on (“primary love”). Balint was one of the British object 
relations theorists, analysts who saw humans as fundamentally seeking to connect 
with “objects,” not to reduce tension or gratify drives as Freud had thought. This view 
broke from one of Freud‟s most basic premises. While psychoanalysis from the 
beginning was somewhat relational, since after all it was rooted in a form of 
empathy for the feelings of a person in need, its relational foundation became more 
prominent, explicit, and pervasive in the work of the British object relations theorists. 
 
A leading one of these theorists, W.R.D. Fairbairn, did much to address the needs 
and concerns of women, which earlier theorists had tended to neglect. Like the 
other object relations theorists, Fairbairn based his work on Melanie Klein‟s 
perspective that infants from the start are fundamentally interactive beings. 
Radically departing from Freud‟s views, Fairbairn (1952) emphasized that human 
motivation is based not on the seeking of pleasure, but on the traditionally feminine 
concern of connection with others. While Freud thought the analytic cure resulted 
from the patient‟s insight, Fairbairn (1994, p.79) thought that it came from the 
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patient‟s new capacity for object relations. This new capacity, Fairbairn believed, is 
brought about in the context of the analyst‟s relationship with the patient.  
 
Fairbairn (1952, pp. 34-42) conceived of the developmental process in a way that 
countered the male bias in the tendencies of existing developmental schemes. He 
proposed that development moves from “infantile dependence” to “mature 
dependence.” Fairbairn saw infantile dependence as an oral, incorporative, taking 
(rather than giving) state wherein the subject does not differentiate the caregiver 
from herself. Mature dependence Fairbairn considered a more cooperative, give 
and take state in which the caregiver is differentiated from the one cared for. The 
distinction between infantile dependence and mature dependence creates an 
alternative to the idea that the goal of development is autonomy or independence. 
Fairbairn thus questioned the widespread male-oriented assumption that 
independence is a possible (and desirable) goal of human development. This 
assumption is deeply rooted both in psychological theory and in the human psyche. 
Fairbairn‟s challenge of this assumption contributed to the feminist view that the 
assumption helps to cover up male dependence on the relational world.  
 
In the early decades of the 20th century, anticipating later developments, Karen 
Horney wrote an incisive critique of penis envy, responding to Freud‟s conception of  
female development. Addressing Freud‟s conception, Horney (1923) asserted that 
“the conclusion so far drawn from the investigations—amounting as it does to an 
assertion that one half of the human race is discontented with the sex assigned to it  
and can overcome this discontent only in favorable circumstances—is decidedly 
unsatisfying, not only to feminine narcissism but also to biological science (p.38).”  
Horney‟s view of penis envy revealed the male bias in Freud‟s developmental theory 
and showed how this theory functioned to legitimize male domination.  
 
In recent decades, a number of psychoanalytic feminists have found object 
relations theory useful for rethinking the psychosocial development of gender.  
Object relations theory helped to shift theorists‟ concerns to the periods of 
development earlier than the Oedipus complex, changing the focus from the 
father‟s relationship to the child to the mother‟s. The relationship between the child 
and his objects now became a central concern. Theory came to stress the basic 
importance of the mother‟s nurturance and attachment to the child, hugely 
neglected in Freud‟s generally non-relational developmental framework. In this way 
there came to be studies of the role of the environment in child development (a 
significant focus of the object relations theorist D. W. Winnicott). Following the 
example of such earlier thinkers as Horney (1923) and Clara Thompson (1953), and 
relying on object relations theory, psychoanalytic feminists explored the roles of 
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culture and society in the construction of gender differences. Both Chodorow (1978) 
and Dinnerstein (1976) believed that since in our culture the young boy lacks the 
direct and concrete identification with a same sexed parent that the young girl has 
with her mother, the boy develops less of a sense of connection to others  (the 
opposite of the girl‟s relational focus). Jessica Benjamin (1988) considered the 
psychosocial dynamics of male domination. She critiqued the psychic structure of 
“doer” and “done-to” that underlies domination, taking into account “how 
domination is anchored in the hearts of the dominated (p. 5).” Questioning how and 
to what extent autonomy can be a desirable character trait, psychoanalytic 
feminists also stressed the need (for both sexes) for such traditionally feminine traits as 
empathy, compassion, and emotional connection. The works of these feminists have 
influenced authoritarian and patriarchal trends both in terms of the directions of 
research and in terms of the values and models that therapists bring to 
psychotherapy.    
 
Considering another source of relational psychoanalytic studies, Greenberg and 
Mitchell (1983) used the word “relational” to refer to an underlying framework shared 
by British object relations theory, self-psychology, and interpersonal psychoanalysis 
(an American school of psychoanalysis stressing interpersonal interaction). This 
framework has come to be called “relational psychoanalysis.” Mitchell has been 
considered one of its most eloquent proponents. In one sense, the word “relational” 
simply suggests an emphasis on relationships. In relational psychoanalysis, as in 
Fairbairn‟s theory, change occurs not through the development of insight, but 
through changes in relationships. This can include any relationship in the patient‟s 
life, but especially, at least initially, his relationship with the analyst. Thus there is an 
emphasis on working with “real” relationships, along with the patient‟s relationship 
with internal (or imagined) objects.  Working with the real, present day relationships 
of the patient, her relationship with the analyst, as well as with the patient‟s 
intrapsychic relationships, the analyst may consider the patient in many contexts.  
 
Relational psychoanalysis depends on a critique of Freud‟s (1927) belief that an 
analyst can be neutral and objective, and thus serve as a “blank slate” onto which 
the patient projects his unconscious fantasies. Relational psychoanalysts have 
pointed out that when the analyst remains detached and tries to reveal nothing, this 
itself is a way of presenting himself, which may, for example, make him come across 
as uncaring, if not inhuman. There is no way for the analyst to be objective. 
Moreover, by putting aside the objective, detached posture, the analyst becomes 
both 1) more inclined to become (usefully) caught up in the patient‟s projective 
identifications (a complex process in which the patient‟s projections are 
experienced by the analyst in ways that can reveal the patient‟s unconscious 
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thought), and, 2) more able to help foster an experience for the patient that redoes 
(or “corrects”) the effects of bad parenting. By discarding the belief that she can be 
“objective,” the analyst becomes more responsible for how she chooses to act with 
the patient and for the effects of those actions.  The analyst thus comes to see her 
role not as one who discovers the truth, but rather as one who constructs a 
perspective. There is a reduction in her authority. Analyst and patient come to 
interact on more equal terms.  
 
Due to the challenge of authority in recent psychoanalytic theory, Irwin Hoffman 
(2003), a relational theorist, believes that the analyst‟s authority today can only be 
seen as an ironic authority (emphasis ours). This is in part because the analyst faces in 
analysis the challenge of “personal participation in the interaction in a spirit of 
mutuality, the kind of participation that exposes the analyst‟s fallibility, vulnerability, 
and even exploitativeness (p. 4).”  As therapists we become highly trained at 
seeming empathic, when in reality of necessity our flaws and unseemly reactions are 
a substantial part of the therapy. The ever gentle, empathic stance of the therapist is 
always, to a degree, a reaction formation. As with the client, it may be that for the 
therapist as well some of the most important thoughts occur not in direct response to 
the therapy (at the manifest level), but in the latent content of the therapist‟s 
thoughts, which can only be unraveled gradually and indirectly. 
 
Psychotherapy has a long and increasing history of cultivating the practice of 
nurturing. Yet psychotherapy, we believe, remains based on a contradiction:  it both 
supports and opposes authoritative, patriarchal discourse. Its clinical methods, which 
stress empathy, often seem to come into contradiction with its social dynamics, 
which can stress the authoritative. Empathy is contrary to authority since while 
empathy is based on receptivity towards the other‟s perspective, authority seeks, 
however subtly, however implicitly, however indirectly, to coerce or persuade the 
other into accepting one‟s own. 
 
No matter how one responds to the question of authority in psychotherapy--and this 
will depend on individual clients and circumstances--it is not possible, given our 
complicity with authority, to simply be “for” or “against” it. One cannot maintain 
what Hoffman (2003) refers to as “the neatness of the dichotomy (p.4)” ( between 
nurturing and authority). Perhaps at times one can manage a synthesis which 
includes important elements of the two. One might attempt to retain from authority 
in some way the importance of the therapist‟s expertise, while seeking to do away 
with the therapist‟s mystique and any encouragement of a client‟s attitude of 
compliance. One might cultivate a gradual process of moving in a collaborative 
direction, rigorously upholding the premise that knowledge and expertise do not 
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imply the superiority of “knowing better.” This may include explicitly teaching clients 
ways of interpreting their own unconscious. Mitchell (1997) believes that one might 
transform the traditional concept of authority by denying that the therapist has 
access to “the truth” about the patient, and helping her instead to become “the 
author of her own story (p.8).” Clearly, one needs patience and creativity to respond 
to the issue of patriarchy and authority in therapy. One needs to admit that we do 
not have the answers--though we badly need them.  
 
It is a task of psychotherapy, therefore, to continue to conduct, bit by bit, an inquiry 
into the subtle dynamics of authority and patriarchy in our deep clinical worlds. We 
need to make explicit the social dynamics of this allegedly private space. In recent 
years, many writers have discussed the necessity of collaboration for psychotherapy. 
We need to learn more, however, about the subtle forces that block such 
collaboration.  For these hierarchical dynamics are part of a long history, which is 
mainly unconscious--the history of the societies that tend to devalue nurturing. We 
would like, finally, to invoke a metaphor to portray a scenario in psychotherapy, a 
scenario  which reminds us of the story of Penelope‟s loom, to borrow Mitchell‟s 
(1988) borrowed metaphor (ch.10), where the shroud so arduously woven all day 
long (through the work of nurturing) is promptly unwoven at night (through the 
dynamics of authority). 
 
Conclusion 
 
We hope that our examination of womb envy has raised some questions about the 
nature of power in our society and where its authority has come from. We hope, 
firstly, to have shown that womb envy played a significant role in the historical 
traditions of Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and Islam.  We also hope to have shown 
that the defenses against womb envy, for example, the appropriation defense, can 
lead to insensitivity or even contempt towards women, and a consequent disdain for 
nurturing. We have tried to suggest that womb envy, through a systematic rejection 
and devaluation of the feminine, has helped to bring about a world in which such 
values as nurturing, compassion, relationship and connection tend not to be highly 
valued in the social world (e.g., in the world of work). We have examined how a 
devaluation of nurturing, being part of our society as a whole, occurs even in 
psychotherapy, where nurturing is fundamental. Finally, we have looked at how 
writers have managed to bolster the role of nurturing in therapy, despite its constraint 
by the socially prevailing tendencies of hierarchy, authority, and patriarchy.  
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